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AFTER LEIBNIZ-DISCUSSIONS ON PHILOSOPHY
AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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Prepared for:

Advanced Research Projects Agency
National Institutes of Health

March 1974

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MARCH 1974

COMPUTER SCIENCE DEPARTMENT
REPORT NO. STAN-CS-74-411

**AFTER LEIBNIZ... :
Discussions on Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence¹**

by
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Abstract:


This is an edited transcript of informal conversations which we have had over recent months, in which we looked at some of the issues which seem to arise when artificial intelligence and philosophy meet. Our aim was to see what might be some of the fundamental principles of attempts to build intelligent machines. The major topics covered are the relationship of AI and philosophy and what help they might be to each other; the mechanisms of natural inference and deduction; the question of what kind of theory of meaning would be involved in a successful natural language understanding program, and the nature of models in AI research.

¹ We are very grateful to John McCarthy for his helpful comments at various stages during our discussion.

The writing of this paper, and some of the research described herein, was supported by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Office of the Secretary of Defense under Contract No. DAHC 15-73-C-0435 and National Institutes of Health Contract NIH-MH 06645-12.

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BRUCE

Well, here are some questions we might start off with, though they are so vague that we can argue over the meaning of the questions, yet alone their answers. What is the relation between AI and the traditional studies of intelligence viz. philosophy, psychology and linguistics? In the following senses

1 Would a knowledge of those traditional subjects help me to make an intelligent program directly? Can we firm up philosophical (or even psychological) theories enough to make concrete statements about robots with them?

2 Would it help me indirectly, for example in the sense that modal logic isn't directly useful since its formalisms are weak, but the logicians' examples are illuminating and raise interesting issues?

3 Is it a good heuristic to ignore all such subjects, because it would take so long to sift through them to find something of value that in that time you could have discovered it from first principles? As by analogy, there is not much point in ploughing through Roman arithmetic if you have just invented zero and the arabic notation!

4 Now the other way round. Would a working robot, with natural language input etc, have any effect on practitioners of the traditional disciplines? I suspect that philosophers would be unaffected, psychologists helped quite a bit, and linguists mostly wiped out.

RICHARD

Here are my answers, following the same numbering: 1 No! I don't think so. There is even less evidence to believe that these disciplines have anything computationally significant to say even granting that they have clear "ideas". 2 Yes. At least in some cases they can tell you what not to do. 3 In general I think that it is important to think through unsolved problems (or those with disputed "solutions") without being greatly influenced by people's previous attempts at the problem. Studying another person's blind alleys before you have a collection of your own is probably a waste of energy. Of course that doesn't mean you should work in ignorance of other peoples work, just that if it has not obviously succeeded then you should be skeptical of it. Good ideas eventually shine through. In addition, most work in those traditional areas was before any knowledge of any complex but "well-understood" and manipulable objects like computers. Thus our whole experience is different from theirs.

YORICK

I disagree with your remark about "clear ideas", Richard. It seems to me that in many traditional disciplines there were people making important use of notions like "clear and definite procedure" long before the first computers: the behavioral psychologists; Vienna Circle empiricist philosophers etc. I completely disagree with Bruce above about the relations between "tough, good little AI", and "vague sloppy old philosophy". Bruce says that maybe philosophy could be suggestive if only it could be "firmed up". This is all topsy-turvy: it's philosophy that is precise and AI that needs firming up, as he puts it. Bruce's criteria of firmness are all wrong: writing programs is indeed firm, but can be firm

and totally pointless, just like copying out the phone directory by hand or something equally definitive. Philosophical analysis can become trivial, I'd be the first to agree, but never quite as trivial as mindless programming.

Ezra Pound used to say that "after Leibniz, a philosopher was a guy who was too damned lazy to work in a laboratory", and there's something in that. Often, philosophical analysis done in isolation fails to get any insights, insights that might well come from trying to build a system. But analysis has all kinds of goodies to offer AI. At the simplest level it could do something to inhibit AI usages like "epistemology" when "logic" is meant (usually "intensional logic"). The same goes for the AI use of "Theory of Knowledge". If anyone says, like Humpty Dumpty, that we can mean anything we like by words, then all I can say is, why pick those philosophically loaded words to tinker with in the first place? These are not at all trivial errors. They clutter up thought.

ARTHUR

I concur with what you've just said, Yorick, but I'd like to press the point further and say that AI people may simply not understand that a great many of the virtues that they see emanating from the 'computational metaphor' are already well-known to philosophers. Your example of 'clear and definite procedures' indeed goes back to the notion of algorithm which obviously was understood by ancients like Euclid and Pythagoras. Pattern-matching, that current darling of AI, is a notion that Wittgenstein certainly knew about.

A lot of the confusion may be caused by a failure to realise that philosophy has evolved a very definite technical vocabulary, and that, as you said, you just can't go around taking a philosophical argument, making the words mean what you think they *should* mean, and then pronouncing the whole thing to be sloppy, irrelevant or just plain boring!

BRUCE

Can you be a little more definite about Wittgenstein and pattern matching?

ARTHUR

What I mean by that is that Wittgenstein's major concern in his early work was the question of how the logical structure of propositions reflects, or more precisely, is a 'picture' of the world it represents. His conclusion, roughly speaking, was that the meaning of a proposition was embodied by the actual disposition of variable and predicate names within it, and that bindings to the variables must obey category rules which correspond to the categorial structure of the world. According to this interpretation, the reason, for instance why the sentence 'Aristotle is stupidity' is meaningless is that there is no legitimate logical form for the corresponding fact.

BRUCE

Oh, at first I thought you meant Wittgenstein knows all kinds of things about pattern-matching languages (or sublanguages), concerning good and bad features, implementation problems etc. Now I see you mean he had a theory of the world which depended on some notion of matching between structures, and that you think this could be implemented in

terms of pattern-matching as we know it. I think that's a bit different, though still very interesting.

How should we go on from here? Our further discussion could have two aspects. The first is technical, and is concerned with making robots. It is about questions such as "how much does a robot have to know about the world vs. about language?", and I think that we are all in agreement about this. There are some misunderstandings, but these are all relatively unimportant. The second component is about things like "what is meaning?". But if we are agreed on the first component, then the second is really rather pointless -- I really don't care which part of the robot's hardware/software is the embodiment of the meaning of the word "like", for example. If the robot can talk about liking, and reason about it, and seems to "understand" the word in the sense that someone else does, then I am happy. There would no doubt be 700 Ph. D. theses on whether the thing was dictionary-oriented or not, and whether it was Popperian or Carnapian and so on, but these disputes would be restricted to crabby old philosophers and their pupils.

So why should we talk about philosophy and psychology at all? The reason is that although we are agreed about the types of structures we need for our robot, they are nowhere near specific/well-defined enough to be implemented. Part of the steam in our disputes is generated by Yorick's thinking that the models we are proposing are well-defined but that he does not understand them. But really the requirements we have put forward are incredibly vague. We look to philosophy to find *more detailed* ideas about the kinds of structures that could be in our robot. And of course we are disappointed when we find lots of philosophers are even vaguer than we are!

TOM

I disagree with two things that Bruce has said we all agree about! First, we are not at all in agreement about how much a robot has to know about the world and about language. Yorick and I, for example, are in strong disagreement about that, though I think that part of our disagreement comes from Yorick thinking about translation while I am concerned with the whole range of intelligent behavior.

Nor do we have any general agreement about what the structures are. We might agree on what behavior is desired. We don't have agreement on the design criteria to achieve that behavior, much less on the specific structures. The discipline of AI does have some specific structures but not enough, and very few have long term value.

YORICK

Well, Tom, I'm not sure I want to admit that our disagreement springs from my petty concerns versus your large and general interests in intelligent behavior. The other person's concerns always look a bit limited. It's quite true that I'm more interested in language structure (not in translation *per se*) and how we understand it, and that I assume that the solution of those problems will have impact over the whole range of human intelligent behaviors. Conversely, you're more interested in vision and expect similar general advantages from any advance on the vision front. I think that's a fairer statement of the nature of our disagreement.

Bruce, why are you looking for the philosophers to provide you with programs at all, why should they, what makes you think its their job? Though, I must admit that, having said that, it's clear that the philosophers that AI people tend to be aware of also tend to be those like Turing, Davidson, Grice, Montague and Searle, who have all, in their different ways, provided something like protocols for programs. But that doesn't mean the others should, or that those listed are the best or most central philosophers of their generations.

BRUCE

We are not necessarily asking the philosophers to write our programs for us, but to give us constraints on them/ideas about them which are powerful enough to be of (in the best of all possible worlds) direct help. The disappointment comes not because philosophy hasn't solved the "problem" (whatever it is) but because the relevant discussions have not reached a concrete enough level. For example a robot-builder will have to take some position on intensional objects, but the possible positions are hard to find. And I agree strongly that the people who philosophers might point you at if you complained about a lack of concreteness viz. Davidson, Montague etc are even worse as they really have nothing much to say because their formalisms are so puny compared with computational ones.

Philosophy is too concerned with how things *might* be with reducing possibilities from the top down: but at some stage it is worth *diving in* and testing out a few ideas about how things *are*!

ARTHUR

Maybe I'm just not understanding you, Bruce, but I don't see at all how you can say that, for instance, Montague's formalism is 'puny compared to computational ones': where exactly is this powerful computational formalism that you have in mind? After all, you just said that the problem in AI is that the proposed models are not as well-defined as Yorick thinks they are, and that you, in your delightful naivete, have looked to philosophers for *more* detailed ideas. So how, then, can you turn around and attack a formalism, (like Montague's, however inadequate it might be), after you've admitted that you have nothing to put in its place?

Of course, philosophy is indeed concerned with how things *might* be: but that is precisely its strength! It *prevents* you from diving in and hitting your head on an unexpected bottom. Drowning is a thing that AI is always in imminent danger of! Part of AI's trouble, as I see it, is that people just don't look before leaping.

BRUCE

But does philosophy tell us that certain approaches to AI will fail? For example, what would the Austin-Strawson-Grice approach to a natural-language understanding program be? Note that (like everyone else interested in philosophy) Yorick and Arthur are pretty schizophrenic in that their philosophy does not enter into their programs, and their writings are clearly split between the practical (congh) and the philosophical. This split is a bad sign -- is there any mutual feedback between philosopher-Wilks and roboticist-Wilks?

YORICK

Well, a Popper-robot would be quite different from a robot with a standard philosophy of science: it would go round busying itself trying to disprove its general beliefs all the time!

BRUCE

I still think that getting into philosophy, in classical philosophy's terms, is probably a waste of time (for AI people at least) because the aims and ways of thinking are so different from ours, and digging in in our own terms is so difficult that it has often been said (e. g. above) that it is quicker to rediscover any of anything you need rather than dig through that subject trying to decide what is useful. This is also said of psychology and linguistics, but not of mathematics for some reason -- probably because so many AI people have mathematical backgrounds!

So this is what we ought to be doing, though like the robot's insides it is not specified enough to let us just go and do it. But please let us have less of the "meaning of meaning" discussion sort of thing in AI. Less of the "do read Strawson on Individuals it will blow your mind and alter your programming style immeasurably" stuff too - the latter really means "I think Strawson on Individuals has something to say to AI people, but I'm damned if I know what it is - maybe you will find out for me".

ARTHUR

I really can't accept that I am, or anyone else is, quite as schizophrenic as Bruce wants to make out. I can think of several occasions in the past history of AI where a little critical forethought in the philosophical manner would have saved people from lurching up blind alleys. Firstly, for several years (roughly from 1960-68) most people who might be regarded as pioneers of AI thought that the first-order predicate calculus would be an adequate vehicle for representing knowledge for a robot. The result was an enormous effort in automatic theorem proving (I'm not, of course, saying that theorem proving is not an interesting technical subject). This effort was, from the point of view of people interested in representation, of limited usefulness. Now a philosopher could have told you this beforehand, simply because he already understood the technical limitations on what the language could possibly express (a standard philosophical concern, mark you!) He might even have been able to give suggestions for better languages, e.g. tense logics for dealing with time, change and causality, and epistemic logics for handling knowledge.

The second case is in linguistics: a Chomskian (and Chomsky *did* think of himself as a philosopher) would tell you that you needed transformational grammars and only a very little semantics (probably of the Fodor-Katz flavour) for a language-understanding program; and an ordinary-language philosopher would (crudely) have said that 'meaning is use' (notice the thoroughly proceduralist dictum -- it could have been said by Hewitt!). He would say that what you should do in the first instance is collect examples of how words are used in various contexts. A philosopher of the Montague-Hintikka school (an entity which I'll create for purposes of argument -- Montague and Hintikka in fact have distinctly divergent views of this subject, but their approach is similar) would argue, as I've tried to, that what you really need is a theory of how words refer to objects. I'm not sure, for example whether Winograd can be put into my camp or with the proceduralists: he seems to have elements of

both. I don't know whether he even consciously thought about which position he was taking. I do believe that his work is a good example of how a philosophical position, and one which was well-known in all its important facets several decades ago, can be embodied in a powerful program. One isn't denying at all the value of being able to write programs to test out ideas, but one does want to question the idea that ideas can evolve by themselves, *ambulando*, during the writing of programs. This last notion is surely contrary to the canons of programming itself.

BRUCE

It sounds to me as though you are trying to claim that "critical forethought" is a philosophers' monopoly!

ARTHUR

No, of course I'm not trying to claim anything like that! All I'm trying to say is that philosophy, as a discipline, is in some large part devoted to trying to analyse the *a priori* limits on our knowledge.

BRUCE

Sorry, it was just my way of saying that the *results* aren't obviously more than those you could get by using critical forethought, i.e. we haven't obviously got much help in program design from purely philosophical considerations.

YORICK

I'm not sure I agree, Arthur, that your two cases are of the same sort, because Chomsky et al. have never been taken up by AI people in the way the Predicate Calculus was.

Now to Bruce's question of what effect the construction of the all singing, all dancing, all talking robot would have on philosophers. As you suspected earlier it would be zero, and *they'd be quite right*. This ties up with my distrust of what Bruce calls "the Philosophy of AI". I've not seen that there is any, or that there are any intellectual questions to which AI has contributed a single thought (I'd love to be proved wrong on this).

A clear proof of this is the endless AI discussion starting with the assumption "suppose a robot walked in here and behaved exactly like...". Most people who *do* this don't realise that the discussion was conducted much more elegantly by Descartes in the 17th. Century, and that the *nature of the assumption* hasn't been altered one scrap by the invention of the computer.

RICHARD

I don't agree. The exact nature of the robot would matter. Suppose it had biological components, as opposed to just digital ones. Or suppose we could show that a digital robot could not exist, i.e. is essentially unrealizable. Certainly that would alter your ideas about the real world.

YORICK

Weil, alright, perhaps I should have said "most of the questions about the assumption haven't etc...." Bruce, you talk often of "philosophical results" and their possible relation to AI, and I think this phrase is near the heart of our mutual misunderstandings. For, in a straightforward sense (the one I assume you mean) there *are no* philosophical results. And that fact doesn't devalue philosophy in the least. It may just be the case that there are AI problems on the one hand, and there are philosophical problems on the other, and the two sets are simply disjoint. In the same way you wouldn't expect the solution of problems in psychology to solve problems in economics. Life is just like that. It doesn't mean that Philosophy is of no value to AI.

Another thing that worries me is that when AI does come up with a potentially contentful general idea, it is hardly ever stated in a clear and comprehensible way. Take two cliches of MIT-AI "Meaning is procedures" and "Heterarchy not hierarchy". There may well be something in both of those theses, but I have never seen either of them stated in such a way as to make clear that they don't mean the things philosophers interpreted them as meaning at various times in the past (particularly the first). For, in those senses the statements are pretty straightforwardly false. Most straightforward interpretations of the first, for example, would mean that we could then no longer usefully distinguish between words whose meanings plausibly *are* procedures (like "unscrew") and words whose meanings clearly *aren't*, like "mud". In the case of the heterarchy thesis, I suspect it's merely incoherent, and is not a thesis at all but a disguised injunction to use certain kinds of program control structures. But of course it's hinted at that its *much more really*. I suspect that its adherents haven't actually thought out whether they are exhorting people to construct programs in a given way, or whether they are making a real claim about the things named in their slogans.

If the basics of such principles were set out, the rest of us could get round to reasoned objections to what we think they mean (because of course, while there's no clear statement there can be no clear objections. Religious leaders have known this for millenia!!!)

ARTHUR

Yes, that's a very good point. What about the case of the dictum that you mentioned: "meaning is procedures"? It's been my impression that this was a strong view, well-articulated by some of our colleagues; but when I search their papers for that view neatly encapsulated, I can't find it clearly set out in anything like that form. Some of this may be due to a modest realisation on their part that there is no pat answer to the question of what meaning or knowledge is, but somehow that doesn't emerge at all clearly.

Let's imagine for a moment that such a creature as a "pure proceduralist" exists, devoted as he is to the notion that all knowledge is to be represented in the form of procedures (programs for doing things). Of course, we might argue among ourselves whether such a creature *really* exists. I personally am inclined to think that, at least in terms of the implications of what they've said and written, that most of the MIT people can, to varying degrees be tarred with this brush. But what would be the effect of such a pure proceduralist approach, such as I still think the MIT school has advocated, on a general theory of how robots would behave? I take the proceduralists to be saying that intelligence consists of

'knowing *how*' rather than knowing *what*': now this view is one of the corner-stones of the behaviourist philosophy that was developed by Gilbert Ryle among others, which argues that talk of mental states is illicit, and that only behaviour and dispositions to behaviour are the legitimate concerns of psychology. This view has it seems to me been effectively demolished, and is now regarded as rather old-fashioned. Do the proceduralists have some answer to this, or is it yet another case of AI rediscovering ancient philosophical controversy?

There is perhaps a further point that should be brought out about the proceduralist thesis. I take it for granted that a proceduralist in AI would want to say that he was doing real epistemology, and perhaps even that he wanted to make his theory of knowledge all-encompassing. Now, if he's honest, he will have to accept that a proceduralist view of human beings might well lead to the impossibility of developing a theory of ethics. What I mean is that, if you press for the impossibility of having any declarative information around (any 'maxims' as Ryle would have it) then you seem to leave yourself no grounds for deciding *what* to do in a given situation, or on which to choose which of two equally 'efficacious' courses of action to follow. This I find rather worrying. Although I'm not really saying that we should worry about robot ethics at this point, I do feel that there's a problem here for people, like the MIT defenders of proceduralism, who also seem to feel that AI is the study of general mechanisms of knowledge and intelligence, rather than the construction of robot machines.

YORICK

You're right that there are such clear analogies between Ryle and the proceduralists as, for example, both would want to answer a question like "Does Smith know chess?" not in terms of what Smith knows, but in terms of how he performs. And of course Ryle could have said "the meanings of many mental terms are really procedures", and the proceduralist might find himself agreeing.

But I think this agreement would be almost wholly illusory. Ryle as a behaviourist is interested in external behavior and never in internal representation. The proceduralist is the reverse. The illusion of agreement is because Pseudoryle uses "procedure" to mean "external behavior" and the proceduralist uses the same word to mean "internal process" or "how my program runs". Hence we have a classic misunderstanding.

My hunch is that the real intellectual ancestors of the proceduralist are German idealists like Hegel and Fichte (and Marx to some extent) who really thought that the world was what our consciousness constructed. This is very like the proceduralist/model people who talk of "block" as meaning what is manipulated by their procedural model -- the world has no reality to them over and above what their system does with it. Hegel would have felt fairly at home there, though, as a metaphysics, that is demonstrably inadequate for both robots and for a model of ourselves, because real blocks always turn out to have properties over and above such procedural definitions.

ARTHUR

No, Yorick, I don't see that there is any real difference between Ryle and the proceduralists along the lines that you think. It seems to me that Ryle was in a fairly clear sense

concerned with internal representations: his point was just that any discussion of 'mental concepts' must be couched in behaviour terms, rather than in terms of occult intellectual episodes.

Perhaps, to move away from philosophical historiography, I can suggest a way of escaping the Rylean arguments, which take the form of a claim that any examination of maxims before executing some behaviour involves an infinite regress (examining the maxims is itself a piece of behaviour which needs evaluation at some meta-level, and so on). The tool for our escape comes, paradoxically from the proceduralist's first love -- pattern-matching. If we have a machine which can activate procedures in a pattern-matching kind of way, then it seems we have escaped the infinite regress: the very existence of a certain pattern of declarative information (a set of predicates or whatever) will generate the appropriate behaviour. Does this make sense?

TOM

I don't recognize the proceduralist position as it's being described here. If we are talking about work done at MIT, I doubt that there is a clearly defined position. The point of discussion is whether they meant to deny declarative knowledge. They did not. There was a reaction against theories which denied procedural information. What appeared to me was a real concern about predicate calculus formulations of knowledge, whose language was inadequate, and whose information was mixed up in a sea of undifferentiated statements, and that some form of program control was necessary. There was no sense of denying declarative information, only that adding procedures was a powerful and simple way of adding control while localizing the context of information.

BRUCE

Yes Arthur, you are trying to read too much into what programmers say: of course Hewitt suggested, and Winograd used, procedures in an interesting way. I don't think either of them would want to go further than that.

ARTHUR

Oh!, but I'd thought all along that Hewitt and Winograd, like others of their ilk, were genuinely interested in *epistemological* problems. If you're right (and I don't think for a moment that you are!), and their only claim is to be "using procedures in an interesting way" then their work, excellent as it is, seems to lose a lot of its intellectual force and interest.

RICHARD

But, Bruce, some people in AI as a matter of fact now do hold positions amounting to "procedures are the *meaning* of words". Much programming effort flows from this general positions -- and that is true even though they don't want to defend or discuss them philosophically. They have influenced people, some from outside the AI community, to accept these positions.

YORICK

I agree strongly with Richard about the odd, slippery, way in which the "meanings are procedures" position is sometimes held, i.e. it's defended until attacked, and then held unquestioningly again. Nothing improves or clarifies by discussion and debate, even though any strong form of the thesis is clearly untrue.

However, I think its espousal has had a very good effect in the campaign against the MIT Linguists: Chomsky and his various schools of disciples. They have floated so far from any conceivable procedures that a little over-emphasis the other way cannot hurt.

BRUCE

Don't let's confuse a discussion of the correct methodology/philosophy of AI with a discussion of the relevance of philosophical results for AI. I am sure many people agree that much AI has been done sloppily and there is not enough discussion of basic issues before jumping onto the console. Of course there are interesting technical topics we can discuss here in the "philosophy" or general attitudes of our subject: Can we sharpen our ideas of design criteria for intelligent programs? How sensible are the various approaches that have been/ are being taken? I think we should move on to more specific areas and to the interesting, and generally unstated, general views that people in AI would have to have to justify the work they are doing.

YORICK

I agree, but before we move on, may I try a better justification for more philosophical care in AI. Intellectual disciplines progress by the dialectic of assertion and critical counter assertion. AI is very very short on useful and insightful internal criticism. What there is, by and large, is busy people building systems at keyboards and screens in isolation. There is tremendous pressure to be positive at all costs (this may be more an American characteristic than an AI one). The Michie-Clowes interchange is one of the few clashes of view in print that I can think of, and very useful it was. Why is there not more of this? God knows we need it! It's not as if people in the field don't harbour very hostile views in private - but these are never articulated or made precise. Here I'm sure philosophy could be very therapeutic, bringing out all those aggressions in a satisfying way.

Pat Suppes once argued that what you usually get in AI, in the absence of rational criticism and discussion, is a series of love affairs: people seize on some piece of work every few years and fall in love with it, then later fall out of love with it. Just as in love, and later disillusion, reason plays no part at all.

None of this is meant to be negative, or to prevent work of any sort going on. It suggests that people should be more generally aware and pessimistic, and then push on anyway. It's disastrous to want to stop even those enterprises one is sure are metaphysically mistaken. A clear case is the dispute between Newton and Leibniz: Leibniz argued that Newton's notion of action at a distance was metaphysically incoherent. And, of course, two centuries later he was generally agreed to be right. Even so, it would have been scientifically disastrous in the short run if he had been able to convince Newton of that and to have stopped his work on gravitation!

TOM

There seems to be an implicit argument that AI could not mean anything to philosophy, not that that bothers me. But philosophy is said to be concerned only with non-contingent matters. If that particular view of philosophy is interesting, then it gives up vast areas which traditionally were philosophy and which are now physics, psychology, physiology. Virtually anything I care about seems to be contingent, and particularly what we are capable (in a hardware sense) of seeing, perceiving and representing. If none of this experimental epistemology is relevant to philosophy, then what is non -- contingent? It would seem that only formal systems are. In our systems we don't capture the world, only our model of it. But in some way, philosophy is not allowed to ask whether the model behaves like the world out there, only like any possible world out there. How do we choose axiom systems? I realize that there is a lot to do with formal systems, but that field is crowded, what with mathematics and AI both involved. I would like to talk about a practical epistemology for an intelligent being. Richard points out that if we could show that the human brain can be imitated by a finite state machine, that tells us a lot. He also points out that the presupposition of AI (and any science) is that an enormous part of the universe can be modelled by some formal system. But does philosophy not allow itself to care about whether the formal systems model this world, these humans?

YORICK

I think, Tom, that you have a too jaundiced view of philosophers: certainly there are still many who proudly claim to be concerned only with what they call second-order questions. That's not the same as what you call non-contingent matters, because some of those philosophers would say they were concerned with linguistic usage which obviously is contingent.

But we needn't worry about them, because many philosophers *are* interested in AI, and it's a fair bet that many of the great philosophers of the past would have been very excited by it, as they were by all the philosophical developments of their own days. Certainly no one here, I think, is trying to prove the total independence of philosophy and AI.

Perhaps we should move on, as Bruce hinted, to more specific questions. For instance, it seems clear to me that many approaches in AI are too deductive, and that for many reasons this cannot be either a fruitful model of how brains work, or the basis of a sensible information processing system. What I mean by the distinction between inferences and deductions can be illustrated off the cuff by analogy with doing geometry by proofs or by deductions. One does school geometry examples by proofs, written or drawn, yet one *could* do them by deduction in some powerful language, like set theory, in which each step was deductively valid. But that would be insane. It would be like reading a book letter by letter instead of simply reading it.

BRUCE

You are right, but geometry is a bad example to start with as it can be formalized relatively easily and the relation between inference and deduction is clear. This is not so in general, as you will no doubt want to say. That's why mathematics is such a *bad* problem area for AI: the facts that formal deductions exist makes people concentrate on making deduction-

checkers and deduction-engines without thinking about what things go on in a person's head when looking for a proof. Or even when understanding one -- it is clear that published proofs (which aren't usually very formal, actually) are only the surface manifestation of something much deeper.

Whatever the procedures running in the head are, it seems better to play with computer models of them: directly rather than with logical descriptions of them. They can be described in logic but I don't think they can be modelled by it.

YORICK

One could support this point with an analogy from scientific method, where the question of the axiomatization of a scientific theory only arises *after* there is a theory. In many areas of AI people are trying to go directly to the axiomatization when there is no substantial theory to axiomatize. They simply assume that the process of axiomatization also, and at the same time, provides some content.

BRUCE

Yes, I think the distinction between axiomatizing a theory in a logic and modelling thinking as deductions of a logic has escaped several people in the field.

RICHARD

I don't think that the distinction you make between deductions and proofs and inferences is as simple as you pretend. Your own comments seem to me to indicate a lack of "mutual" understanding of what words should be attached to what notions. I propose that by a proof of some fact (or sentence if facts can be expressed by language) we mean whatever it is that carries conviction for us, i. e. what convinces us that it is true. Better yet whatever evidence it is that allows us to assert it as a fact. By a deduction we should mean what people usually call a "formal" proof. These require a language in which it is decidable what is and is not a sentence (is English in this class?), together with a decidable predicate $\text{Prf}(x, A)$, which singles out as assertable those sentences A for which there is an x with $\text{Prf}(x, A)$. The nature of the allowable x 's or how you discover them is irrelevant, it is the ability to decide $\text{Prf}(x, A)$ for any particular x and A that makes the "proof" formal.

This notion of "formal" proof is of course very wide. It includes all computations (and maybe more depending on what it means to decide). This was intentional, as I wish to emphasise that all representation theory in AI is caught doing deductions in this sense. I believe that my distinction is more weighty than just saying something like "of course we are always doing deductions, all we have are digital computers". Namely it shifts our emphasis from arguing over how "formal" your way of doing AI is, to "What is the nature of the formalism that I am proposing?". It is only bad propaganda and sloppy thinking that allows yourself to be drawn into arguments about the "informality" of an approach to AI.

Using this terminology, Yorick, I understand you to mean that you find the traditional deductions, e.g. in the lower predicate calculus, or some of the usual forms of set theory, at least as expressed in terms of axioms and "deductions" by suitably applying collections of rules of inference and theorems, are unsatisfactory as a theory of reasoning.

in light of the distinctions I am trying to maintain I would like to introduce another notion, argument, (a term once suggested by Bruce) to mean those kinds of things usually written down in books which tend to convince us of some facts. This notion is distinguished from proofs in that arguments are linguistic in nature. I see arguments as representing the linguistic traces of proofs. With this new notion at hand, (correct me if I'm wrong Yorick), you seem to suggest that inferences in AI should be made in some formalism whose basic building blocks look more like arguments than traditional "deductions".

Contrary to you Bruce, I think that geometry is a particularly good example. The distinctions I just mentioned are clear there. The arguments given in geometry texts are compelling, that is they seem to carry conviction, and thus qualify as proofs, but as it turns out the arguments given in most secondary school texts are formally inadequate, in that the continuity axiom is missing, and thus cannot be justified by deduction from the usual Euclidean axioms. It took as good a mathematician as Hilbert to correctly formalize geometry.

I see the problem differently. One question to be asked about geometry is whether or not the arguments as presented in elementary texts, as the traces of proofs, can be generated in a formal way at all. Another, more relevant here, is what exactly is the language of arguments and what is the corresponding notion of valid consequence for them. I feel that if you cannot say something clear about that then you are not talking about AI (which at present involves *digital* computers).

BRUCE

I would like to argue that McCarthy's distinction between the "heuristic" and "epistemological" adequacy of a reasoning system causes some trouble. Suppose we have a system in two parts, the facts and inference rules (of course John wants us to have some fairly straightforward logic here), and secondly some engine which decides which inference to do (I think John thinks we can worry about how this works later). The system is meant to be epistemologically adequate in that all the right inferences can be made in the first part, and heuristically adequate in that the second part actually gets them done appropriately. Let's call these the axioms and strategy parts. Using the system to represent an agent's knowledge, clearly the agent doesn't know everything that follows from the axioms, only those things that the strategy "allows" it to deduce. But if I want to talk about what someone *else* knows, my *axioms* must cover his *strategy*. For example, the fact that he never does proofs of more than three steps must be described. This is going to be quite a system, and of course the ordinary logics people have been using have nothing to say here at all.

ARTHUR

Well, there are two points that I think should be made: firstly, I think there is some confusion in the way that McCarthy has used the terms 'epistemological' and 'heuristic'. He can of course use those words to mean anything he likes, but it's unfortunate that they already have well-established meanings for philosophers -- meanings which don't seem to overlap precisely with his. McCarthy's term 'epistemology' seems to have features which traditionally have been regarded as being metaphysical and ontological, as well as

epistemological. Traditional epistemology is concerned mostly with the actual process of acquiring knowledge. Metaphysics is concerned with the limits which are placed on knowledge, and ontology of course is concerned with the question of existence.

But secondly, even though I'm unhappy with his use of words, I really feel I must defend what I take McCarthy's basic point to be: that it is worthwhile exploring the limits on the expression of knowledge independently of actually trying to express something in particular. This I think is a valuable insight which deserves stressing to AI types, who are generally quite ignorant of the fact that this is a well-established concern of philosophy. His notion of 'epistemological adequacy' is, to my mind, extremely important if we are to get anywhere with the problem of representation. It allows one to say "aha! yes I see that I really need to model his strategy in my language" without having one's head cluttered by worries about problem-solving methods, *per se*.

BRUCE

No, you have abstracted his position to the level of remarks such as "think carefully", whereas the argument is a much more technical one than that.

RICHARD

Bruce, what kind of "reasoning" do you propose that is not related to some calculus for making deductions? The study of (or notion of) the validity of this reasoning is surely in the traditional realm of logic.

BRUCE

Traditional but not modern. Surely most logicians today don't think they are studying how people think? And if I tried to pass myself off as a logician people would think I was joking. When I say "logic is no good" or something like that, I mean that logicians don't have anything to tell me about how people think, and their formalisms reflect this. Now if you want to say that any search for a calculus for modelling actual inferences is by definition logic, then tell me why more logicians don't do logic!

RICHARD

I think you underestimate contemporary logic. Metamathematical studies and proof theoretic studies are centrally concerned with the questions of both what kinds of objects mathematics is about, and what kinds of evidence is acceptable in making inferences, either using proofs or in deductive systems. You are not clear when you say "actual" inferences.

YORICK

Well, OK, Richard, you want to use "argument" as the word to oppose to "deduction", rather than "inference" as I suggested initially, and that's fine by me -- though I think there's perfectly good traditional justification for the one I started with.

Your notion of "proof" is very interesting in itself, but doesn't give us anything to really get our teeth into as yet (without more work on your part) because by definition it's an

entity existing in a non-symbolic (and not merely non-formal) realm. Perhaps you should tell us a little more about what realm it does exist in? Also, not all our differences here can be cleared up simply by agreeing which words to use and which words to oppose to each other because, for example, you have, I think, a much more formalist idea of deduction than I have -- so for you virtually *any* formal manipulation is a deduction, whereas for me it has to have some connexion with the sort of thing traditionally meant by deduction, that is following by means of a rule expressing a logical truth (in some irreducible sense of that phrase. What I mean here is something along the lines of what Davidson has expressed recently and very well with his "In defense of convention T"). Is there a real difference here or am I just not seeing something modern and obviously true?

ARTHUR

Sorry, but I want to be boring and go back for a second to what Bruce said earlier about logic, since I feel he really is suffering under some misapprehensions about it. A major part of modern logic is model theory, or formal semantics. And model theory's major concern is with the question of what can and cannot be expressed in a given type of language. Surely that must be a central concern of anyone who is interested in expressing knowledge in any formalism whatever.

Also, I don't think, Yorick, that you're being particularly fair when you say that Richard's notion of 'proof' is unsystematic. People are just now beginning to have some rigorous insights into how people carry out proofs, and I think it will turn out that one can talk about them in a much more substantive way than you think possible.

BRUCE

Arthur, I know you *think* that, but who are these people? What are these insights? Or is it all just a feeling? Don't get me wrong, I don't object to feelings, but I don't think you should be allowed to get away with saying that "... people are just now beginning to have some rigorous insights into how people carry out proofs..." without some justification. I'm not aware of any results in psychology -- surely you aren't talking about results of logicians?

ARTHUR

As a matter of fact, I am. You know, of course that there has recently been considerable effort by some logicians, of whom Kreisel is the most prominent, to get some systematic insights (from a logical point of view, of course) into the nature of the curious mathematical objects that we call proofs. And, unless I'm much mistaken, the study of the metamathematics of proofs is one of the things that Richard has in mind in his work on a first-order machine proof checker.

BRUCE

I spy an attempted proof by repetition! The "systematic insights" you speak of are of interest to those working in the foundations of mathematics, and to some philosophers; but I want to know about what goes on in people's heads as they become convinced of something. People in foundational studies don't address themselves to that problem, at least not in any direct way, and it isn't even clear that they should!

YORICK

Arthur, I wasn't in any way accusing Richard of being unsystematic. He's putting a novel idea, and claiming that proofs exist in some non-symbolic realm. I suspect there's a lot in his idea, but even he isn't claiming that its systematisation arises at the moment. I was pressing for "metaphysical exposition" of the idea, as it were, and that comes way before any formalization of it.

Let me propose a naive example of actual, or "contentful", inference in natural language analysis of what I call "preference semantics" (PS). Suppose we are analysing "He pushed the book off the table and it fell". We want to know whether the "it" refers to the book or the table, and we can all see it is really the book. What I think of as the PLANNER or deductive method here would want to use, in some way, a "theorem" of the form "Unsupported objects fall". It would have to find that it was a relevant theorem and then put it into some deductive structure together with the representation of the example sentence, and perhaps other knowledge. What I call preference semantics would look into what it knew about the meaning of "fall" and see that in its representation it preferred unsupported objects as fallers, and then infer from the example that the book was unsupported. I'm not pressing the details of this example but opposing two general approaches, one of bringing in facts from a pile, the other from scrutinising the meaning representation you have more deeply and using preference rules.

BRUCE

But I don't see where the "opposition" is here. There is no way to understand the sentence except by reference to knowledge about falling, books and tables. Whether the relevant facts are in a pile of theorems (which is obviously structured in some way to allow sensible access) or a pile of "meanings" (ditto) is irrelevant at the level of our discussion. And we would ask the same question about both implementations. For example, suppose the previous sentence were "The book tied to his waist lay on the table which was tottering on the brink of the abyss, and was the only thing keeping it in balance.", then how would the system's state have been different so that the pronoun reference was done correctly?

YORICK

No, Bruce, of course I am not denying that knowledge is needed to settle such matters: how could I be, for what else would settle them? And all the elements in the example I outlined are clearly knowledge. It is true that I am emphasising again a distinction I made earlier between facts and meanings. The fact that drinking is essentially of liquids is not just a fact -- if you think it is, ask yourself how matters could be otherwise while drink retained its present meaning? Whereas, that hands have 4 fingers *is* a fact, because they might have eight without changing the meaning of "finger" or of "hand".

This distinction is important here because to see that questions are about meaning encourages one to see them as structured: the whole "facts" approach is inherently atomic, and leads to the view of piles of unstructured "theorems" which you too are against, I know. That's the opposition. I know you want to say that facts can be structured too -- OK, and recent things like Minsky's "frames" are indeed attempts to structure facts in the same sort of way (as active slot-filling patterns) as preference semantics tries to for more conceptual objects. But its going to be a hard row to hoe, because of the sheer multiplicity of them.

Now to your example, ok so it would fool my system in its basic form, because it was designed to do so. And to get it to do that you had to produce a sentence that is simply not how that message would be conveyed by a competent human speaker. You've had to (in my terms) satisfy a preference and overthrow it in an awkward way -- and the awkwardness isn't accidental. If you think it is, provide an example that isn't awkward.

For any system you can design examples to throw it. So what? What is a good system for you?

BRUCE

No, I didn't think of your system (or even need to know its details) to think up this example. Its a question of two different pieces of text setting up different expectations. A *general* idea -- perhaps its use qualifies me as a philosopher!

YORICK

Fine, but you're talking now in terms of Charniak's system of setting up different expectations in advance, with what he calls "demons". Mine works backwards and forwards from problem-causing pronouns. There's something to be said for both approaches: from my point of view I prefer a system that sets up all this machinery only when it has a problem it can't solve by simpler methods of inference. The massive forward inferences to no purpose that the demons do seems to me computationally hopeless.

But my point here is that, for every example of yours that satisfies a preference and then overthrows it, I can set up an example that satisfies a demon and then satisfies another one, inconsistent with the first. So what, still, is a good system for you? Given your premisses you should like the example I gave, it seems to me.

BRUCE

Well, I don't really want to say that Charniak's system is the right one either, but I certainly agree he might get my funny example right. For him the problem is resolving some conflict between the "if something is falling it could well be the table", fired up by the first sentence and "if something is falling it could well be the book" fired by the second. I would argue that here we have at least some way of *talking about* and perhaps in the program *resolving* the difficulty, whereas PS as you have presented it is too rigid: you seem to regard preference as the answer rather than just a good heuristic.

YORICK

But Bruce, the method you've proposed doesn't lead to any way of solving the difficulty at all, and as we all know, there can be no *general* way of locating contradictions. What you're expressing is an *aspiration* that such a contradiction will be found. I'm prepared to bet that in any system where every sentence fires up large numbers of expectations, whether or not a problem demands their firing, and so on right through a story, will never locate any such contradiction at all.

In any case there's no problem at all in my system in accomodating a specific overthrow of

a preference, in such a way that the system knows something odd is going on, as in a case where we are told that a bottle is made of steel specifically, and then an ambiguous pronoun reference problem arises whose solution rests on *not* then applying the preference of "break" for fragile breaking things, because we now know something special and odd about the bottle, as in the sentence "He dropped the bottle on the table and it broke". There's no problem there for a system that sees a preference is being contradicted and keeps that fact around for a while.

What's most disturbing to me about your example and your discussion of it is that you don't seem to see the need for a system of local inference in natural language understanding, as a pragmatic fact about the language. That is to say, a system of local preference that can indeed in exceptional cases be overthrown and be superseded by a system of "global" hacks. I produced an example of such inference, and you seem to think that you're showing something by producing a clumsy and complicated counter-example. You're not. In fact you're rather helping me make my point, namely that any theory like yours (following Charniak) that thinks you can understand language texts with only global expectations is computationally hopeless and psychologically implausible.

My precise answer to your point remains that for every example of yours that requires hacks to supercede preferences, there will be an example of "contradictory demons" requiring similar hacks. But the preference system at least provides a psychologically plausible theory of local inference, and the other one doesn't.

BRUCE

Obviously "Charniak" means different things to different people. It seems to me that a program which is reading and understanding text should build up a model of what the text is talking about, as it is reading, and use this to help the understanding e.g. to help find referents of pronouns. The model would for example keep track of who is where at what time (in the imaginary world of the story); then uses of the word "he" might have their references decided by using this information. (You need syntax too!). A problem immediately arises: how do you find the *relevant* parts of the model at any given time? Charniak's idea was (something like) "let every thing in the model look out for text later in the story which might refer to it". Of course there are problems with having too many demons and having conflicting demons: the whole system needs much more structure, and indeed Charniak didn't say how to get over these difficulties. So I see an attempted solution (demons) to a problem (relevance) raised by a theory (maintaining a world model). Perhaps my dissatisfaction with PS is caused by my inability to make this decomposition for it.

We do need to make "local" inferences, but the measure of locality surely refers to distance in some complex structure representing what went on in the (imaginary) world of the story and the importance of different facts and events. Indeed Charniak had no such structure, but you almost deny the need for it, by substituting "local in the text" for "nearby in the model". Of course this approximation often works, otherwise I am sure you wouldn't use it, but you have not illuminated whatever it is an approximation of! It is often necessary to distinguish the *story* from the *way the story is told*, for example to deal with flashbacks. You don't do this (fine, nor does anyone else), but you don't see the need either!

YORICK

Well, I can't make much of that because I don't see any content to your "model" or "theory" or even a running system to back the notions indirectly. All I see is an aspiration to build something that will somehow "know everything about everything". But that's all square one stuff as far as I'm concerned. I was trying to offer a concrete example from a concrete theory embedded in a running system. What puzzled me was why you bothered to attack it so. Why do you always go on about texts with puzzles in them such as flashbacks or clever overriding of preferences?

BRUCE

I thought you would ask that. I think this is where we differ: I am saying "think about these funny things, they seem to exemplify (perhaps in some extreme way) what goes on a lot in natural language", and you say "actually they hardly ever occur and I'll worry about them later". I think your theory has a hole in it, whereas you just think it needs extending. Presumably only future attempts on larger domains of discourse will resolve the argument.

YORICK

No, I'm pretty sure that's *not* where we differ because I also like to emphasise difficult things against the proponents of simplistic theories of language. I think that I can deal with the things you mention by extensions of the mechanisms I propose. Where I think we differ is that I think you have no theory of *language* (as distinct from reasoning) at all, nor do you see the need for it. Your distinction between the "non-linguistic story" and "the way it's told" makes this clear. What people have to understand *is* the way it's told. And, if it's told in certain ways they won't understand it, whatever a theory of reasoning may say to the contrary.

You, like Minsky and Charniak and probably many more, think you can assume some abstract linguistic representation, not bother to actually apply it to language material, and then get on with the "interesting" stuff like the "reasoning" and so on. This view is *profoundly* mistaken because the possible inferences also *determine the form of the representation itself*. In the simplest cases, possible inferences determine which sense of a word is the correct one, and hence the form of the representation of the sentence containing it.

BRUCE

No, I don't have a theory of language in the sense of how to string words together. I happen to think (with others!) that the "inference" bit is what we currently need to work on, and I was looking at your system as an "inference" system, without thinking about how you actually gobbled up text in the input. Perhaps you think I shouldn't (or really can't) do that.

At least we agree on the deduction/inference dispute. Any sort of interesting notion, such as "like" covers so much -- you really can't represent it by a predicate -- that in any realistic system a complicated structure of notions and inference rules will be needed for it. For example, suppose Fred's saying "I like fish" becomes $\forall x. \text{fish}(x) \supset \text{likes}(\text{Fred}, x)$. But we

know the following: he probably doesn't like fish that has gone off; he may well not like certain fish cooked in certain ways; there are probably fish he dislikes but has never tasted. He may have forgotten he dislikes rock salmon, but we don't interrupt him with these objections, unless we are "logically"-minded pedants. And if we did, he would say "Come on, you know what I mean" and indeed *we would*. In other words, we cannot model someone's liking for fish with the simple sentence given above. Now the more sophisticated logic types will say they never intended such a simplistic representation, but they never say this unless pressed, and never seem to attempt the fuller axiomatization!

YORICK

I agree with you entirely about the importance of setting up systems of inference for natural language prior to any attempted axiomatisation of them (something that's taken for granted in all other sciences). Let me just add here that what I said earlier about the "non-availability of contradiction" in general was meant to apply to the analysis of stories and texts. I didn't mean to deny its value (1) in robots and (2) in simulated model worlds.

In the case of a robot, really moving about in the world with deductively manipulated information and plans, the world itself provides a clear sense of contradiction: if all the robot's deductions tell it the door is open, but it bangs into the firmly closed door in fact, then the conclusion is contradicted and the preceding premisses can be reexamined, as would be the case with a scientific theory refuted by unsuccessful experiment. That is to say, the premisses may be unreliable, but because there is firm contradiction of conclusions the deductive machinery can transfer "not" back to the premisses by *modus tollendo tollens*.

This situation I maintain is quite different from the analysis of continuous natural language where there is little or no expectation of contradiction: if, in understanding the text, the understander erroneously infers A, there is little or no chance of encountering the assertion -A in the text in the near future.

In the case of model worlds, simulated after the fashion of Winograd, something else occurs. Here there is no contradiction at all, but there is no cause for it since all premisses are, in effect, analytic and no real information can ever enter the system. For example, after executing the command "Clear off the top of the red block", it is clear by definition. No lingering and sticky cigarette end can remain to imperil the stability of the house of bricks about to be built. It will be clear that such situations have little to do with the unreliable inductive information required for the analysis of natural language.

BRUCE

To deal with the latter point first, in the perfect toy world things indeed never go wrong, but that can be a valid simplification if some other point is what is at issue. In the robot case, the contradiction of conclusions is not as firm as you think. Take the example of putting in a bolt. If it fails, i.e. the bolt is seen not to be in the hole at the end of the attempt, there are any number of possibilities for what went wrong and where the bolt is now. You cannot possibly afford the strategy of checking each micro-step as you go along either, though of course because the task is governed by the laws of physics there is a good chance of eventually finding out, whereas with people this kind of experimentation is usually impossible. "She said she'd meet me outside Lyons' at three, but I never saw her again."

YORICK

You're right about the robot and contradiction, of course. I was only trying to make the point that in the analysis of texts the role of contradiction cannot be central. One could not just throw in any old rules, as one might for dialog, saying "oh well, if they go wrong then the other participant will let us know somehow, that we've gone off the rails."

BRUCE

Oh I don't know, what about Agatha Christie novels?

YORICK

I don't understand why you say that at all!

BRUCE

The point is that in mystery stories you *do* make assumptions, sometimes unconsciously, and you *are* able to deal with things when the facts (of the story) contradict your model. "I was sure the butler did it, but there was a clever twist at the end."

YORICK

Oh sure, there can be clever twists at the end, just as there can be jokes, puns, lies, and poetry. The important thing is that most understanding is *not* of such things. This cycles straight back to our earlier point of dispute, where you think counter examples knock down theories of *normal* inference, whereas they don't, but only show the need for supplementary theory or hacks. What you don't see is the need to put anything contentful in the center, because you seem to think that every utterance is a puzzle. It isn't. It's only the schizophrenic who wonders (using all his global knowledge about everything) whether the waitress is propositioning him when she asks "Can I help you, sir?".

May I add two clarificatory points about what I meant when I referred to PLANNER just now. I am not *opposing* PLANNER-type approaches to more conventional complete methods in theorem proving here. For me, they are only interesting different methodologies, but both aim to set up deductive structures in a quite conventional sense -- as distinct from PS structures, which for example would tolerate the coexistence of, say, $H(a)$ and $\forall x. \neg H(x)$ in a way that no system can and remain deductive.

BRUCE

You are quite wrong about the kinds of inference people want to do in PLANNER (whatever *that* is!), and I think this is the source of our disagreement. Like you I don't find logic or formal semantics very useful (or even illuminating), so let me say a bit about my view of logic.

YORICK

Well, I may well be wrong about what they *want* to do, I'm not privy to that, but I'm pretty

sure about most of what they've done. It's the old difference between what is and one's aspirations.

BRUCE

I have argued above that the inferences people make in everyday life, and which we would like an intelligent computer to be able to make, cannot be modelled in a straightforward way using a simple logic. Firstly the logic would have to be self-referential in order to deal with inferences about other people's inferences. Secondly, many attributes cannot be described by predicates, nor is it clear what the domain of their values would be if they were described functionally. Before mentioning a few more difficulties I should say that shooting at "logic" can be done at many levels, from a rejection of systems based on any notion of truth, through dislike of the current crop of modal logic ideas and on down to sniping at first-order predicate calculus. Doing the latter has led me to the former! But the arguments against the simpleminded approaches are so overwhelming that it really does surprise me to find people still peddling first-order logics. Unfortunately this is not a straw-man.

Consider what happens when you make some decision based on what you know, but when you find out more facts you reverse the decision. We cannot represent this by:

$$A \supset C$$

and

$$A \wedge B \supset \neg C$$

since these are contradictory! Now it could be (probably is) that what happened was that $\neg B$ was a hidden antecedent of the first inference, hidden in the sense of being ignored. But clearly we cannot in any reasonable system represent *all* the antecedents, such as "if there isn't an earthquake", "if I don't have a heart attack", "if relativity continues to hold (at least approximately!)" and so on. This is McCarthy's qualification problem.

Another difficulty is that logical implication does not correspond very well to the notions of causality which it is often used to represent. Far too much follows from finding an inconsistency!

ARTHUR

While it's true that in a simple-minded logic the kind of problem that Bruce just described would be fatal, I don't think there's any difficulty in handling it now that we have much better insights into the notion of entailment than that captured by strict implication. Everybody knows that strict implication leads to paradoxes of the form

$$P \text{ and } \neg P \supset \text{some } Q, \text{ and some } Q \supset P \text{ or } \neg P$$

It's also well known that one of the reasons for this is the interdependence of truth and falsity in the classical systems. Systems of entailment like those of Ackermann, Anderson and Belnap and so on seem to be able to handle the paradoxes, and so they remove the problem that worries you that a contradiction implies anything.

How would you deal with the hidden antecedent problem in PLANNER - surely you'd have to have a demon on the lookout for the occurrence of 'B' and when it was activated what this demon would do is change the procedure call which had previously handled $A \supset C$. This is also the kind of thing one does in logic. In some sense the two implication symbols would have *different* interpretations - different models. Logicians are actively working on this topic, so one can hardly claim that it has been ignored.

BRUCE

I must be more careful. I suppose I was trying to fire in two directions at once, namely (1) sociology of logic -- why are the sophisticated approaches you advocate not the ones actually being followed up? Do people think that because *some* logic *might* be useful, *all* logics are thereby made interesting to work on? (2) I actually don't think the notion of truth is at all basic.

Of course it would be foolish to suggest that logicians and philosophers haven't recognized and worked on at least some of these problems. But as I've said, I feel that their results, in terms of formalisms, are not much use to us. That isn't to say there are no useful ideas in logic: on the contrary the ideas of quantification, variables, scope and binding used even in first order predicate calculus have all been incorporated in programming languages, as has the notion of possible world from modal logic. And of course the way logic allows an axiomatization to be built up incrementally, with the various sentences being independent is something that designers of languages for AI systems designers strive to allow. However in languages such as (the mythical) PLANNER there are powerful computational devices available which allow many more kinds of inference: interrupts, parallel processes, demons, monitors, sharing, programs as data.

ARTHUR

Ah, but there's the problem that I've tried to point out to you in previous conversations, Bruce: the problem that neither PLANNER nor its descendants, all of which have the notion of possible world, honestly faces up to the ontological issues which arise. This is the problem of individuation -- there seems to be no facility in these languages to handle the question of how to make identifications between individuals in one possible world and the same or counterpart individuals in other worlds. PLANNER may appear on the surface to handle the traditional problems of failure of substitutivity of equivalents and existential generalization, but on closer analysis we find that it's in fact evaded the really hard issues completely, by having dummy variables which cannot be identified across contexts. So one has to be pretty wary of saying 'Oh, PLANNER and so on have coped with all the logical/ontological problems, and they give all the extra goodies to boot'. They may do the latter, but I remain firmly skeptical that they have done the former.

BRUCE

Here is a *very* simple approach to the "Bill likes fish" statement mentioned above. Don't take it too literally -- at this level QA4 and POPCORN are indistinguishable!

Bill likes fish.

TO-INFER [Bill likes ?x]

then INFER [fish ?x]

This suffers from all the problems of the PC representation, but for example adding

Noody likes mouldy things.

WHEN-INFERRING [?x likes ?y]
then (INFER [mouldy ?y]
→FAIL inference)

now stops the "Bill therefore likes mouldy fish" mistake. Now of course in both systems the original rule could have been changed, but the point here is that in the PLANNER system we could add the rule about mould *later and separately* and get the right answer. Suppose we decide that Welsh people like mouldy fish (but not anything else mouldy), then

The Welsh like mouldy fish'

WHEN-INFERRING [?x likes ?y]
then (INFER-SET {[Welsh ?x], [fish ?y][mouldy ?y]}
→/ignore all more general inference monitors/)

will do the trick. Of course there will be objections to this, but they will be mostly to details, to the actual representation, i.e. arguments *about liking* rather than about schemas or logics. Well perhaps there is one general objection -- "You aren't using a well-defined logic so how do you know your system isn't inconsistent?". A quick reply is that this is a universal problem for large systems, or even for small ones judging by the number of inconsistent axiomatizations of Michie's trivial "Blind hand problem" that I've seen ! But a better answer has two parts: firstly we won't lose as badly as first order logic because our notion of implication is much more causal and constructive, and secondly we have powerful debugging tools (tracing, advising etc) to explore and remedy the problem, so that in the course of experiments we can trace inconsistencies, perhaps finding some general class and implementing a solution with a new piece of information.

Proponents of the logic approach may say that they can do all these things too, with advice attached to axioms etc, but as we have pointed out above there is a strong distinction between advice which speeds up certain inferences and advice which prevents certain deductions from being made i.e. which alters the semantics of the system.

RICHARD

I believe that on both points you are wrong. This type of rule might be more causal but certainly not more constructive in the usual logician's sense of the word. To begin with, constructive rules are supposed to present themselves as valid. Secondly these "tools" for remedying inconsistencies simply do not exist ! Your casual reference to "implementing a solution with a new piece of information" simply points out that the formalisms you suggest might *sound* good, but in actual fact reveals that these formalisms, like the

traditional ones, also suffer from the lack of sufficient reflexiveness or at least our ability to use them in that way to generate programs of their own.

YORICK

This stuff of Bruce's all seems a good thing to want to do and I'd just like to point out that we have just such unquantified inferences actually running in our system. If we turned your example into a linguistic problem (that's a matter of taste and interest I suppose -- but I feel happier when a thing is not *just* answering little questions like those of your example) we might have:

"Bill likes fish. The ham is good but the fish is mouldy. Bill likes it. "

Our set up would get the "it" as meaning the ham, despite the first sentence, provided we had an inference rule that could be written as follows (with English words for the pieces of semantic coding and numbers for the variables):

(1 BE MOULDY) \rightarrow ((\ast ANI 2) NOTLIKE 1)

where \ast ANI simply expresses a matching restriction on variable 2 that anything fitting it must be animate.

ARTHUR

Perhaps we should move on to another major question: that of 'meaning'. This is of course a topic that is closely connected with inference, and the question of what kinds of actual entities a natural language analysis program should be able to manipulate.

It seems to me that no-one is trying to deny that any significant language understanding system, be it natural or artificial, can get along without a dictionary in some sense. If we are to avoid an infinite regress, the question is rather how we are to define the "primitives" of this dictionary. The meanings of words like 'democracy', as Yorick points out, are not themselves facts, but on the other hand, the dictionary entry for such an abstract word must surely, at some remove, refer back to 'real' facts.

So one might argue that a good way to start developing a formal semantical theory for natural language might be to start with an elementary referential theory and then see how it can be expanded to account for more indirect kinds of referentiality. This, it seems to me, is precisely the kind of thing that has been done recently by logicians like Scott, Montague and Gabbay. This work was aimed at developing a way to deal with the very simplest meaning constructs - those that make direct reference to real-world (physical, geometric) concepts. The work of the developmental linguists (Bierwisch, Clark and others) shows conclusively that perceptual entities are the earliest linguistic primitives that a child acquires. Nobody can deny that as he matures the child uses this primitive referential semantics to construct a more connotative system. Isn't it a bit like the way Ludwig Wittgenstein saw things : the primitive structures, the "pictures of facts" *show* their meaning directly, while the complex sentences constructed from them only *say* their meaning indirectly?

YORICK

Well, I can and do deny that claim that you preface with "surely" there, Arthur. I want to reply along two lines: first, even if the referential constructions you speak of could be done, I don't see how they would provide a form of information for a symbol processing system concerned with natural language; secondly, the metaphysics behind the intended constructions seems to me misguided, because words just don't "refer to things" in the way you assume. As to Wittgenstein, remember that he begins his best-known work by quoting Augustine's "meanings are things pointed at" view and then saying: "Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if the child already had a language only not this one." (Philosophical Investigations, §32) In other words, referential explanation is only OK if you know the meaning of the word *already*.

He goes on: "For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is *sometimes* (my italics) explained by pointing to its bearer." (Phil. Inv., §43) The last sentence isn't even a referential semantics doctrine for the smaller class of cases, because he says the meaning is *explained* by pointing to etc. He never says that IS the meaning. As I understand referential semantics it says (1) the bearer is the meaning in general, and (2) hence Wittgenstein's smaller class (the one in which the bearer seems at least *relevant* to questions about meaning) is really the larger class.

Of course I'm quoting Wittgenstein here only to contradict Arthur and to show that he can also be quoted against a referential view.

TOM

If as you say, Wittgenstein's arguments may be taken on both sides, then I don't see what arguments we really have to suggest that the referential explanation is OK only if we know the meaning already, etc.

YORICK

Oh, that's easy, we have the arguments he put when he was arguing on that side. No problem at all. The reason he can be quoted on *both* sides is that, like a lot of people, his viewpoint changed and developed. As always, consistency isn't a great virtue, in people or systems.

ARTHUR

I don't think that I disagree with the spirit of what Yorick says about the pointed-to-object being the explanation of the meaning, as opposed to being the meaning per se. But my agreement is predicated upon my assumption that there really is *no* difference between explanation and meaning -- consider the case of an electron. Actually when we refer to "an electron" we are referring to its place holder in our atomic theory, rather than to any concrete entity. Indeed there seems to be considerable doubt as to whether we can ever "know" an electron directly. My claim is that the same is true for all kinds of other individual terms occurring in the language: after all, there are plausible arguments for

believing that the objects of our direct acquaintance are always in a sense only ghosts of what we take to be the "real", "concrete" objects. I would want to say that the objects that we know directly are *models* of their real-world counterparts. I am using the term "model" in a fairly strict way here to mean an individual within the domain of interpretation of the formal language describing my beliefs: an individual which has properties isomorphic to the "real thing".

This makes an interesting connection with the general issue of what kinds of things do we understand models to be: can we agree on some standard interpretation of this term? of what heuristic value can it be in AI? I would be very interested to get Tom's views on this - when he talks about models, what precisely does *he* mean. This might be a point that we can defer for fuller discussion till a little later. The role of language (obviously) is to convey information about the state of the world to the hearer. The information conveyed to the receiver serves to restrict the alternative states of affairs which could exist at that time -- it can be interpreted by the receiver only with reference to *his* own model of the world around him. Jaakko Hintikka has made the point that when we are dealing with quantified sentences, we cannot in a straightforward way compare them to reality in the way that we can in the case of atomic sentences, as Wittgenstein seemed to think. Instead we must attempt to construct a model in which the sentences can be imbedded, and compare these models to reality.

YORICK

OK, we can now drop the metaphysics of meaning, I think, because I now see that I've misunderstood your position all along. If you agree with me about Wittgenstein on Augustine, and you think "models" are the real objects of reference, then you don't hold a denotational-referential view at all, i. e., that words mean real, hard objects "out there". What I think you should now do is explain how what you want is consistent with, say, Montague's expressions of meaning in terms of set-theoretic expressions ranging over real entities in the world.

A related issue here, about models, is the distinction between meanings and facts on which you touched at the beginning with "democracy". I think any sensible system needs this common-sense and rough distinction in some form, but it is hard to work into either a denotational or a model view. For example, part of the meaning of "water" is that it is liquid, but it's a fact about it that it freezes. Why? Because many Swahili speakers, say, know the meaning of "maji" but have never seen ice. It would be absurd to conclude that their ignorance about ice is ignorance about the meaning of "maji".

ARTHUR

While I maintain that our models of the outside world are epistemologically and ontologically prior to what we might call the "real objects", we must imbed this in a "hypothetico-deductive" framework. Wittgenstein, in the "Tractatus" (which of course is the basic source of my belief that his view was a referentialist one, in that he says something like "The elements of the picture stand, in the picture for *the objects*"), seemed to think that we could just lay our language against the world like a ruler -- I want to say that this is not possible in complicated cases. No, what we have to do is to construct a *theory* (whose individual terms are models of things) and compare that in the traditional common-sense/scientific way against the information that our sensors give us.

I think that I'm able to maintain a distinction between the individuals in my theory, which I've called models, and what are commonly called concepts. Concepts are much higher-level things, and are more like theories, whereas models are isomorphic to what people think exist in the outside world.

RICHARD

Yes, Arthur, but it's not as simple as that, because one's notion of validity depends importantly on one's ontology. Tarski's notion of validity is for, and is only for, set-theoretic structures. Now the structures in your model of the world may be like that, and that theory you mention may apply to it. But the real world may not have structure and so the theory may not apply. One can't just say that such logics as Montague's are completely independent of worlds they apply to, or your model of the world. You may actually have to decide whether you refer to models or to real things.

ARTHUR

Of course you're right, Richard, but I don't believe that I've ever said otherwise: I certainly believe that our models have ontologic priority for us, and that any interaction we have with the "real" world (assuming that we have it) is strongly mediated via the models. So any logical semantics should, ipso facto, concern itself more with the structure of models than with the structure of the world. And it's not absolutely clear, is it, that the kinds of logical semantics I've been talking about have standard Tarskian model theories: they are much more truth-functional in nature, involving in some sense the so-called 'substitutional' interpretation of the quantificational calculus.

TOM

Surely, one can't be serious in thinking that there is a meaning for water for us who know ice, without the knowledge that water transforms into ice at low enough temperature? And even without thermometers, we have a sense of what low enough is. Surely, the meaning of water must also change depending on geographical accidents, historical accidents, and the state of one's own ignorance. The fact that ice is not in the Swahili experience would suggest to me that their meaning for "Maji" does not include ice. It would not suggest that the *meaning of water* is something which is common to all human experience, a least common denominator.

BRUCE

To be a bit more specific: a person has in his head knowledge both about water and about the word "water" or "maji" or "dwr" or whatever. I think the connection is a fairly straightforward one. Now the Swahili doesn't have a representation of the fact that water can become solid, so some (correct) uses of the word "maji" will confuse him, and others will give him new knowledge about water. Similarly, seeing ice for the first time could be confusing or illuminating. We can see how to make a program act correctly (i.e. like a person) here: are you worrying about the "meaning" of "water" as robot-builders/person-theorists, or as philosophers?

TOM

I want to know, Yorick, what you mean by *meaning*. My own sense of meaning is that an orange is an orange. The meaning of a particular orange is the orange itself. Now we can't possibly keep an orange in our head, so that we have a structure of descriptors (always with the possibility of referring back to the original or a specimen of the class (go buy an orange) to enrich the description) but the important part of meaning is the reference to examples. Also, it must encompass the possible experience with that object or class. In some cases, that may be a considerable body of knowledge, and that is the meaning of the word, concept, or whatever. What can we possibly have but facts (in the broad sense of relations and references among concepts)? Thus a meaning is a model, which we can change by reference to the real world (experiment); of course that reference depends on models.

I would entirely agree with Arthur's statement that the objects that we know directly are *models* of their real-world counterparts. That is their purpose. Language is nothing but a low quality link from one's models to another's. We have certain descriptive elements and certain modelling elements (assume, suppose, and all the imperatives used in that sense). People's models are not at all identical, but there is something in common. Most of my discussion is centered, however, on what structure models should have. Apologies to Yorick on the use of the word model. I am equally appalled by his devaluation of the word theory to a little word which is applicable to the products of sociologists and ambitious engineers. read on. But what I mean by model is a structure, since knowledge is tightly interwoven. Add to that, computational structure, since what I want to do is compute. Amend that to read, computational structure which mimics the world, since what I want to compute is: given an identification between some models and observables of the real world, can I explain the changes of state of selected observables by their connections with my models.

Later, I shall want to say quite a bit more about what I take the actual nature of models to be; and also to talk about the relationship of my ideas to the nature of learning.

YORICK

But look here, you can't get away with this, Tom. You've just said that the meaning of "orange" is an orange. You've also said that we know only models directly and they are what words mean. These two views are quite different, and incompatible to boot. You and Arthur really have got to make up your minds which view you hold. Again, you can't say we know models and only models directly, and then talk about comparing models and the real world. If your first assumption is correct, the second task is impossible. Lastly, it's clear we don't know *just* models directly -- from all Tom says about them I seem to know nothing about them, directly or indirectly. I feel on much surer ground in saying that I know my own foot directly than in saying that I know a Tom-model directly, and who could blame me?

What do I mean by meaning? Tom asks. When someone asks me the meaning of X I give explanations till he's happy or shuts up. I rarely if ever point to anything; I often refer to dictionaries because what they contain (not pictures in British dictionaries) maps more or less onto what I mean by explanations. From some of the things he wrote I think Tom accepts this explanation view of meaning. But, I would argue strongly, the view is *prima*

facte different from two other views of meaning he also seems to accept, as I pointed out earlier. I do indeed mean what Tom feared about the meaning of "water"---if we found a substance like water in all respects except that it didn't freeze at all, we would still call it water wouldn't we (doubt that!) - and probably add "tricky water" or something. It would still be water wouldn't it -- that's my point exactly.

On Tom's general point, about models and understanding, I think there may be no real dispute, only a difference of emphasis, between us here. He wants to emphasise the role of facts in the understander/ model more than I do. I want to emphasise conceptual/analytic knowledge. Tom says meaning=model; I say meaning=explanations. There may be no real difference here except that "model" suggests the structure of the explanations is *known*. I do not think it is known, by Tom or anyone else: so I see "model=explanations + *aspirations*". The aspirational mode may raise the morale of the troops, but I don't see it does anything over and above that. All our positions in this dispute are, I suspect, circular. Tom says that people can translate those things for which they have adequate model systems, in his sense of those words, and cannot those for which they don't etc. I cannot see that that is any more than a partial definition of what Tom means by the phrase "adequate....etc", the whole thing is circular because if a system set up by Badman translated without having some set of facts that Tom formerly considered essential for an "adequate model system", he would then say, oh well, so in this case only a part of the *real* "adequate model system" was required, but watch out next time Badman ! There's no dispute here about the need for knowledge to understand: only a question of how much and how to organize it, and how to extend it where necessary in the fact of awkward facts.

It's clear that I think that a lot less knowledge will get you along with translation-understanding than Tom does: moreover I think it should be largely, though not wholly, conceptual understanding and not knowledge of superficial facts. Moreover, as I've said before, I think it should be organized nondeductively and have precise suggestions for how to do that. When Tom talks of "models" as structures of facts/explanations, I do not know what structures he has in mind. I really don't. I know to some extent what systems Tom considers inadequate, but not what would do better for him.

BRUCE

A difficulty/misunderstanding here is that so far facts represented in programs have usually been at a very concrete level i.e. the "Block A is on block B. " sort of thing. Clearly one can *translate* by understanding at a more general level. Putting "The magnet deflected the electron beam" into French could be done without knowing the meaning (or at least the full meaning) of "magnet" or "electron" or "beam": the structure at the level of <actor><action><acted-upon> would be sufficient. In fact, *nobody* knows the "full" meaning of "electron", at least in some reasonable sense. But please don't let's get into philosophy of science!

YORICK

No that's not true, there are running programs representing far more complex facts. The point about translation is correct, but says nothing specific about it vis a vis other forms of understanding. People talk quite meaningfully and adequately about magnets in everyday life without knowing much of what you would call the "full meaning of magnetism". 1

think you've succumbed to the AI mythology that you can't talk about anything properly without knowing *all* about it. But, just look at us, and most of the world's population!!

BRUCE

I am not aware of any programs that really *understand* these more complex facts: I don't mean deep technical understanding, but at some level reasonable for a person. An ordinary person talks about magnets in terms of certain materials, forces and effects. A program that can't do that will not fare well in translating sentences about magnets!

YORICK

Your last assertion can be tested quite easily, and only modesty prevents me increasing your awareness in the course of this discussion.

BRUCE

Your last assertion can be tested quite easily, and only modesty prevents me increasing your awareness in the course of this discussion!

YORICK

To go back a little, I couldn't understand Tom's sentence "The meaning of a particular orange is the orange itself". I don't think oranges have meaning -- except possibly and derivatively as symbols in Prokofieff operas. Word strings have meanings, and I believe those meanings are *always* other words -- c. f.. Quine and Wittgenstein passim on "the inscrutability of reference". It is a profound and enduring myth that we mean by pointing ---we can never do that in fact, at least not unambiguously, and without the whole weight of the meaning being carried by the language and assumptions we share. See Quine *ad nauseam* on trying to know *what* a savage is pointing to as he says "Gavagai". Tom sometimes seems to admit this when, for example, he says that "we know only models directly".

The value of the 'meaning is facts view' depends how widely you take 'facts'. Much of meaning is explained by sentences like "Meanings are what words refer to" (false in this case), and "Fascism is the last stage of monopoly capitalism" (false again). But those are not facts, in the ordinary sense of that word. Anyone who thinks they are should then ask himself how he would check up on their truth or falsehood. Most sentences on this file are of this sort. Arthur thinks that all such sentences are ultimately *reducible* to elementary facts. An interesting thesis, but it is a philosophical position, and not self-evidently true. In the common sense sense of "fact" those sentences are not facts. If by "fact" Tom simply means "any assertoric sentence", then ok, but, as he would say, so what?!

ARTHUR

Now I am, and I suspect Tom is, completely confused by what Yorick means (if you'll forgive the nasty word) by "explanation". I get the impression, I hope incorrectly, that for Yorick "explanations" are a never-ending regression of (possibly recursive) pseudo-explanations. You are quite right in saying, Yorick, that my thesis about ultimate

reducibility to elementary referring locutions is a philosophical position. Surely all of us in this discussion are putting forward philosophical positions. We may care to support these with empirical evidence, but that is in a sense peripheral, in that philosophical argument is in essence analytic, or at least a priori synthetic.

Surely objects *do* have meaning in and of themselves in a very direct and crucial way. If I say to you "you are sitting on a bomb which is about to explode", the word "bomb" in this sentence is in itself insignificant -- it is the *actual bomb* which is about to blow you to smithereens. As the old saying goes "sticks and stones may break my bones, but *names* can never hurt me". Words only act as *pointers* to the objects which themselves have significance in my life. Tom, and I, would say that their pointing is mediated by models for the real thing (without saying that that is all a model is).

But look, Yorick, at the very beginning I said that my view was that the lexical entries for abstract words referred back *at some remove* to 'primitive' terms which gain their meanings by referring directly. So I certainly wouldn't want to argue that your "monopoly capitalism" &c., sentences refer directly to some objects. One might put forward the proposition that if they *did* refer directly to something it would be to people's behaviour in a capitalistic/fascist society, and that this behaviour was captured for us by intellectual/historical models which would allow us to predict behaviour under such a regime. I'm not sure that I want to do that, but it sounds plausible if the first approach won't wash.

Obviously a central tenet of the model-theoretic approach to language is the notion of *truth*. It is a weakness in my present position that I can't decide whether a truly semantical approach, which can be made to work for declarative sentences, can be extended to deal with interrogatives, greetings, commands etc. That is to say, I'm not sure whether the semantic theory can be made a pragmatic theory. This is precisely what Montague tried to do; indeed he went much further, in that he was trying to evolve a general theory which would embrace intensionality, modality and tense. It's an open question whether he succeeded but my feeling is that he set out along the right road, and it's up to others to try making the extensions. C. L. Hamblin has tried, with some success, I think, to extend Montague's notions to questions.

BRUCE

Just a minute! There is this dispute as to whether the notion of truth is a useful basis for a theory of meaning, and though it is well known I think it is worth a brief mention. Take for example the concept of tallness. We can't really think of it as a predicate (of one argument). The question "Is so-and-so tall?" (or even "Do you think so-and-so is tall?") is not always expected to have a one-word answer "yes" or "no". Fuzzy or multi-valued logics don't really do the trick, as they merely extend the range of answers (to "rather", "somewhat" etc) whereas we should really recognize that an "answer" might well involve asking further questions as to the questioner's intention.

ARTHUR

But, that's precisely the kind of thing that a good pragmatic theory *would* capture for you. Nobody would argue that a purely truth-based theory of meaning would be adequate in that

sense. The claims that have been made are two-fold: firstly, that developing a theory of truth is a good (perhaps the only) place to start in developing a theory of meaning, and secondly, that the central tenet of the theory is more to do with whether the hearer can imagine a state of affairs in which a sentence is true. Surely that's sensible, independently of whether the hearer is a pigmy or giant (each would have a pretty good idea of what the sentence "X is tall" would mean to *him*)?

BRUCE

I don't want to labour this well-known argument too much, but unless you give me some more details of what the pragmatics has to do, and how you will handle the "imagining" you mention, I will remain unconvinced.

ARTHUR

Yorick, you mentioned earlier the very important arguments that Quine and the later Wittgenstein, among others, have put forward against a naive referentialism: arguments which are based essentially on the difficulty of knowing what it is the native speaker is actually "pointing at" when he utters a new word. This is a problem, but actually, of course, it's a problem that *really crops up* in a child's attempts to learn its *first* language. Piaget and a great many other developmental linguists have noticed that kids quite often make the mistake of "overextension". That is to say, the use words, say, like "brother", to refer quite generally to all young males. It is only somewhat later in their linguistic experience that they acquire the distinguishing lexical markers which prevent this mistake and allow them to restrict the meaning that they attach to such words. Eve Clark, Manfred Bierwisch and others have suggested very interestingly that these mistakes have their origin in the failure of perceptual discrimination on the part of the child. In fact, they've gone much further along the road of claiming that perceptual processes have profound effects on the development of semantics by children. In the 'Brown Book', Wittgenstein seems to want to say that there is no correlation between explanation and understanding. He tried to say that what is involved in coming to know the meanings of words is not understanding but training. This is surely wrong, in the same way as general statistical learning is wrong compared to learning descriptions. The referential view of language stresses that what is crucial to comprehending the meanings of sentences is the extraction of the concepts behind examples. Early in life, children don't seem to be able to perform this extraction.

YORICK

By common-sense explanations I meant the ordinary language sense of that word -- i.e. more or less what is found in dictionaries. And if you think that's a joke, ask yourself how you explain to someone what a word means except by paraphrasing what's in a dictionary. Our task in AI ought to be to try and express such stuff formally.

I still feel that to say that an object has meaning is to make a joke or pun, and I still find the last sentence about models inscrutable, and as I've said before, inconsistent with the "words refer to objects(physical)" view. I still think a lot of quite low level clearing up has to go into the Tom-Arthur view before its comprehensible.

To give a new twist: to be precise, if words refer to physical object, they do not refer to

models, whatever "models" may be. If words are models (last sentence I think), then words do not refer to them(selves?), moreover I don't think you can really have meant that, because, Arthur, I already know you think models are set theoretic constructs.

I am not saying there are not proper arguments about the truth of such statements; they go on all the time. What is clear is that such justification procedures are not behavioral and not proof or set theoretic in *any sense* at all. You've got quite a bit of justifying of your position to do, Arthur. Let's see an example of a set-theoretic structure: let's see whether it really expresses the meanings of the words it refers to. Your position, like Tom's, may just be saying "there is a structured understanding system we could build." No-one is going to disagree with that; but let's see some definite content and above all some defence of reducibility to set-theoretic entities. We all want to construct understanding systems (models if you will). What I've been objecting to throughout is the dressing up of this enterprise in metaphysical clothes which are indefensible, unnecessary, mutually incompatible and out of style: for example, you hold that we refer to models when we speak, that these models are set-theoretic structures and that they, in fact, are the only things that we have know directly. You are, of course, also advancing the claim that higher level statements, e. g., about Germany, are reducible in meaning to lower level ones about Germans. None of these claims is obvious or necessary to our work. Discussion of them is better left to philosophers. It's no good any of you pretending to despise philosophy and then full-bloodedly defending one of these assertions as if it was the merest common sense, Tom.

TOM

Of course, we cannot point to a thing. We can suggest a set of experiments (look, touch, listen) which have reproducible results and we can store those results in a coherent way. To a certain extent we can communicate the results of experiments to other people, but not very accurately. At best we say "Look, now, there. Forever after, I mean something like that when I say orange." There are enormous difficulties in saying "similar", but we share the same meaning of similar, so saying "forever after" works. Let me repeat "a model is a computational structure which mimics the world", a model is intended to allow thought experiments. Thought experiments are safer, quicker, and more economical than blundering along. I do not understand what Yorick means when he says explanation. Does it mean substituting word strings for word strings? If so, how does the poor soul who receives this treatment know when to shut up, i.e. be satisfied with the explanation (if he perceives that is happening, he should shut up immediately, of course, and seek better company). And do you deny entirely reference in language? Do I or do I not have a structure "that orange" which refers to the particular orange which I have brought for lunch? There are two argumentative copouts to avoid:

not all things are referential;

reference cannot be infallible.

Clearly, many words or phrases do not refer to models of objects; they refer to models, which refer to other models. Some models have reference to objects. A robot must have a belief in objects in the world (in the above sense). This might seem just a useful self-delusion. It seems more fundamental in that it corresponds to a discrimination about

validity of types of knowledge: touch/pain and manipulation seem primal-they do not seem equivalent to vision, hearing, etc. Solipsism does not seem very important; for a solipsist to function in a world like mine, he must use descriptions rather like mine, with all that entails. So reference is not infallible, but it is consistent and predictable (I actually can find that orange).

YORICK

Tom, you say that clearly many words and phrases refer not to objects but to models -- sorry, but that isn't at all clear to the majority of the human race, including most of its best informed members. It sounds just like non-common-sense jargon. Why do things have to *refer* at all to be meaningful -- why, why, why? They are all right as they are, you see.

As to explanations, yes I really do mean, explanations. Moreover, you rightly say, on that view, how could the one explained to ever have a definite shut-up-point -- and you're dead right, he doesn't, and the belief that there is such a point (a definite, logical, satisfaction point, as it were) is utterly wrong. Explanations can *always* be pushed on further -- look at this file -- there is never a determinate stop point -- just as a painter always *could* put another stroke on a painting, but at some point he merely stops, so with explanations. There is always the possibility of an infinite regress, which does not stop with any first terms or principles, because dictionaries are ultimately circular.

Can one press you a bit to say more clearly what you mean by a "model of the world" -- it's clearly fundamental to your view of AI yet also doesn't correspond particularly with any of the standard senses of "model". In particular, could you tell us how your use of the world 'model' compares with the logicians? I think discussing this could be very important.

TOM

Alright, I suppose I should say a bit more about what I mean by models in the AI sense, and how that compares with the notion of model used by logicians. In logic, a theory is the set of axioms (e.g. field axioms) while a model is an object which satisfies the theory (e.g. a particular field). It is an interesting question as to whether a theory has a unique model. A way of thinking is that formal theory hopes to have thinking as a model; or physics theory hopes to have the world as a model (rather than the theory has a model which closely approximates the world). Usually, I think, the model precedes a theory. A model can be thought of as the substructure to a theory; that is, a theory is an analysis of some model.

For those areas which are rigorously defined, a model in AI has the same sense (for me) that it has in logic, except that I would maintain the emphasis that a model motivates formalizing a theory. In most areas of science, the model really is some domain of real world behavior, and the game is to devise an approximate model which motivates a theory.

RICHARD

Well, let me put it this way: how, for you, is a model different from a data base?

TOM

Well, to be a model a data base must contain only mutually relevant and coherent data.

RICHARD

I'm still puzzled as to what you mean by model. What properties does this coherent data base have that makes it peculiarly a model? In particular is it just an uninterpreted language or its interpretation?

TOM

Its both the language and its interpretation. Geometry is a good example of a model in my sense.

RICHARD

What is geometry a model of? It seems to me a model must be a model of something. Is it a model of the world?

TOM

No!, not at all: geometry for me is a model of my (or anyone's) computational structure. The data structure contains declarative information and computational procedures (e.g. vector addition).

RICHARD

Let me put my basic question another way: clearly a model for you then is not just a data base but includes the action of computing not just the linguistic description of things, its *active*.

TOM

Yes, as I said, it includes procedures.

YORICK

Tom, this model, when you've got it, is then a model of the person's computational structure *not* of the real world direct. Then words, for you, refer to these models, and then the models, by some looser relation, refer to the real world?

TOM

Right, though I have a model in me of the world, too. But not necessarily of the whole world.

RICHARD

So you don't feel any need to say *why* this structure is a model of a human's mental activity -- you just say it is -- and the tests are behavioral?

YORICK

And here's a big difference in senses of "model" because I think that models, to be models at all, must have some point by point correspondence with what they model -- and Tom doesn't.

RICHARD

Right, Tom has a behavioral view of models.

TOM

No, the function of models is to predict the future. So they must correspond in a strong sense to the world, but are not isomorphic with it. The models only mimic a portion of behaviour. I contend that the assumption that we know only models, not objects directly, forces us to this view.

YORICK

I disagree strongly, that's a theory that you're talking about. Models only predict the construction of theories -- see Mary Hesse on induction over scientific models. Theories predict the consequences of experiments -- that's a basic difference. Tom, unless you just want to use the two words interchangeably.

TOM

Well, we disagree about the meaning of "model".

BRUCE

Ok, so we differ about that -- but I think it needs stressing here that in spite of this verbal, or labelling, difference, probably all of us want to build the same kind of active computational objects that Tom calls models. All that's at issue is the formal expression of what he calls the "coherence" in the model.

RICHARD

Tom, I think both Bruce and I are a little surprised by what you seem to be saying. Am I right in thinking that you believe that the solution of several individual AI type problems can add up to a general solution. I'd like to explore this, since it certainly influences *how* we do (or should do) research.

TOM

AI encompasses so many areas that there is no one model for AI. For each of many areas there are models, most of which do not yet exist. Some of the domains are quite formal, e.g. geometry and algebra. In these domains, the models are the same as those of logic. In some domains, models may exist without any theory, i.e. without any analysis. For most domains, there are no formal models now, and in many areas, we do not expect any formal models. We cannot really use the same sense of model as logicians for these domains, although the analogy springs from our desire to represent these areas as simply and compactly as we can. We really mean then that a model is a coherent body of knowledge about some limited domain. In reality, it is just a data structure. The form of the data structure is the representation of the domain. There is a group of workers devoted to representing knowledge without specifying what that knowledge is. The more meaningful work, to me, is representing knowledge about particular domains, e.g. shape of objects.

ARTHUR

No, Tom, I think you're misrepresenting that particular group. They are not trying to represent knowledge in abstract. They're much more concerned, as philosophers have also been, with exploring the adequacy of various languages for capturing epistemological structures in a large number of domains. They are concerned with exploring the limits of what can be said; but that's quite different from the rather malicious way in which you've characterised them. But let that pass.

BRUCE

There is a confusion here between two uses of the word "geometry". One refers to ur-geometry, our informal (and mostly unconscious) knowledge about straightness, parallelism and so on (needed for example by our visual system for perspective, occlusion etc), and the other to the semi-formal theory we learn in geometry lessons at school. Perhaps you see the latter as a formalization of the former, but I don't think this is at all obvious. In fact I don't believe it!

TOM

At this point, we want to start asking "model of what?". But we won't. The meaning of 'adequate' is that it predicts a coherent and extensive body of measurable phenomena, i.e. relations among observables. It should also be adequate in the sense of not having demonstrable inadequacies (it should be capable in principle to understand the broad range of behavior). It is impossible to prove, only to disprove a theory, and the way to go about that is look at its structure and test out the independent predictions. The sense of extensive prediction is that there are predictions which are independent of any of the data on which the theory is based. (One school of physics maintains that a theory should only involve measurables.) Often models are taken because they are analyzable (linear economic models) and not because they are adequate. This is frequent in engineering and social science. There are models which are unanalyzable, because the relations are too complex for mathematical analysis, or because the relations are not well-defined, or because the model is incomplete. A phenomenological model may describe the results of a coherent set of measurements, without any sense of describing unrelated phenomena at all. This is a type

of curve fitting, and hasn't any relation to any fundamental structure. It may have utility for experimentation, engineering, or functioning as a biological creature. But phenomenological models are just a form of paraphrasing facts. In many fields, the word theory is used for any trivial explanation: one fact, one "theory". I would instead call this paraphrasing facts, too. There are, in this sense, very few fields with any theories at all. Probably AI has none, although a few extremists might say that predicate calculus with resolution is a theory of reasoning.

BRUCE

Tom, you put too much emphasis on the independence of microtheories, and correspondingly not enough on "knowledge about knowledge" and joining up microtheories (if that is the right way to look at it!). If we can do only a bit of the latter, it is a great help in the former as it tells us about the form of the microtheories and helps us develop them. This sounds a bit like the Richard/Arthur position that if you don't have some coherent overall theory (for them, a logic) then you can't make much progress in the individual areas, but of course I wouldn't want to go that far!

YORICK

But to do this, and create a real theory of language, rather than just a coding scheme, AI must give up another bad habit: the "Queen of the Sciences" thing -- assuming that to deal with language you must express all the information expressible in it -- Tom believes this I think (random thought: how would you keep out the *bad* theories like Phrenology and Astrology? How about Religion?) I think AI must recognize its task as expressing twentieth-century common-sense knowledge.

TOM

Yorick has said that AI should avoid the pitfall of the "Queen of Sciences". I contend that it should avoid the pitfall of thinking that there is a short cut to intelligence without being the "Queen of Sciences". This does not mean that we must extend the frontiers of chemistry, astronomy, physics, neurophysiology, etc. We must, however, incorporate the common sense knowledge (a vast structure) in all of us, and the many models included there. I would ask, what does understand mean? Given any limited domain, we can tailor the knowledge necessary to eliminate knowledge of some domains, but to include all the functions of human intelligence, we will need all the structures, not necessarily in one system. If the system has a really wide range of intelligent function, then most of these structures will need to be there together.

I conceive of the representations embedded in some sort of deduction system. Clearly that system has considerable importance: it is not clear that the deduction system is uniform over all models or that it is neatly separated as I suggest. We conceive of domain specific representation as primary. We want to go on to say how we conceive it possible to form these models. There seem to be two paradigms: the deduction/induction paradigm which contemplates a static world and draws long chains of conclusions; and the passive observer who watches things happen and draws conclusions, presumably on a statistical basis. The experimental paradigm is the only one I consider at all relevant to building models of the complexity necessary. In this case, the system plays with objects, etc., systematically

varying variables according to independence assumptions, drawing hypotheses which are verified by these simple experiments. In this paradigm, none of the chains of reasoning are very long, and they are immediately verified.

ARTHUR

But what are the implications of this for a theory of meaning?

TOM

From this viewpoint, language is merely a low-quality link of our models to those of others. Meaning in language is a pointing to models which point to other models and eventually to objects. That is, we think that language is totally referential, but referential to models. There is no way we can refer directly to objects, but our intent is that our models really stand for something out there. Reference cannot be infallible; any changes which happen faster than we can perceive can be fooled. If I leave, the orange which sits where I left an orange may not be the same orange. It is not even possible to say that the orange is "similar" to any other, except by the grossest flights of belief. In fact, the payoff seems high in proceeding as though we could, and the risks (with oranges at least) are not large. Although language is notoriously weak in bandwidth and expressing our impressions, it is significant that a large part of our high level models come from language, and it almost seems as though that mode is as important as our perceptual systems.

BRUCE

Hmmmm. For me language is a very *high*-quality link. The structures inside people's heads are very complicated, and no two are exactly alike (that's why meeting new people is fun!) so that there is no practical way to integrate my question about so-and-so's tallness into *your* data-structures. The interface we go through is language and the amazing thing is how much we can conjure up in other people's minds with so few words!

I think we should end our discussion by bringing it down to earth and saying how the ideas we've talked about should affect research programmes. How about a description of a robot system that we can all agree on, and then bringing out the differences?

RICHARD

A brilliant idea, couldn't have thought of a better one myself.

YORICK

I'll second that, old Bruce is really miles ahead of us in the clarity of his thinking!

ARTHUR

But very much behind Wittgenstein, Hintikka, Davidson, Plato, Aristotle, Strawson and Thomas.

RICHARD

Thomas? Which Thomas? Thomas Aquinas?

TOM (interrupting)

Less of this philosophical bullshit, let's hear what Bruce has to say.

BRUCE

Thanks, Tom. You seem to be the only (other) sane one here!

YORICK

Seriously now, could we end on a more general note? I'd like to hear some final observations from people on the following: the last discussion about models has shown me something I'd rather not have seen and also answered Bruce's earlier question about the relation between Phil-man and Robo-man. I find myself in more or less complete agreement with Tom about the sorts of active nondeductive models we'd like to build or see built. At the same time I disagree strongly with him about the *metaphysics* of models and reference -- in that he like Arthur believes that meaning *is* really reference, while I believe that it is some internal feature of the whole language system.. All that tends to suggest that the metaphysics are independent of the constructive activity and I don't really want to believe that. Further confirmation of that nasty conclusion is to be found in our varying metaphysical versus constructive alliances here. I suspect Bruce, Tom and I agree on what we'd like to see: something non-deductive, active, without strong theory -- or at least, Tom, you said a short while ago that you didn't believe in strong formal theories -- but I'm not sure you really want to be committed to that. Whereas Arthur disagrees strongly and Richard holds an intermediate position. But metaphysically at least, Arthur and Tom agree, while conversely, Bruce and I agree in opposing what Tom and Arthur agree on (chiefly the metaphysics of reference). Hence the mutual agreements in the two domains are conflicting, thus supporting Bruce's thesis of the independence of philosophy and AI.

ARTHUR

I'm sure your analysis of our respective positions is accurate, Yorick, but I don't see that your conclusion about the independence of AI and philosophy follows at all from it. If I wanted to be harsh, I might simply suggest that all of you other people are simply inconsistent in your views on metaphysics and activity, while I simply hold a strongly consistent view. That's an unlikely, but surely plausible, conclusion, isn't it? I must add that I consider holding such a strongly consistent view to be important simply on the grounds that it makes me much more vulnerable to definitive contradiction, which is an altogether good thing from a general scientific point of view.

YORICK

No, Arthur, there's straightforward misunderstanding here. I'm not advocating that independence (of philosophy and AI -- on the contrary *our* point of agreement is that we're both advocating consistency). Bruce is advocating that independence, and I'm raising again

for discussion the possibility that he might be right, and adducing as evidence the cross agreements we have established. You correctly point out that your metaphysics of reference is consistent with your taste in models, and I agree. May I point out that that consistency of yours in no way contradicts my also being consistent in my non-referential metaphysics and my taste in models. You and I can disagree fundamentally and still both be consistent. Of course, what I infer but didn't say, is that it is those who *cross-agree with you and me on models and metaphysics* who are inconsistent.

TOM

I disagree with Yorick's summary of the putative agreement among Bruce, Tom and Yorick. I do feel that a formal theory independent of semantic domains is not enough; that we must have detailed structures for individual semantic domains, and that this knowledge is our dominant interest. I am not opposed to formal systems; on the contrary, I favor formal systems. I infer a statement that there is an inconsistency between the metaphysical position (meaning is model-referential) and the constructive (build those models as representations of knowledge) position. I fail to see the inconsistency. Nor do I really see clearly what our differences are: they do not seem so clear-cut to me. When I have tried to explore them, the differences have largely escaped like steam, and I remain with a feeling that we differ strongly in our estimate of the pragmatic values of formal systems, philosophy, and detailed knowledge of individual domains. Further, we differ in the problem areas in which we want to make progress, i.e. formal systems, language translation, perception. I sense among us an intolerance that I expect among the most delightful people.